Open platforms often have individuals running/hosting their own repositories, which means the risk is distributed.
This means that the individual repository can be attacked without affecting the whole network. The risk is still there, but they would have to simultaneously attack all repositories at once and succeed with all of them.
In a corporate-hosted platform like Snaps, you have one centralized location that can be abused and that can affect all repositories in the system.
If someone hacks Canonical, they can make the whole Snap Store an attack vector without nearly as much effort.
If someone hacks Canonical, they can make the whole Snap Store an attack vector without nearly as much effort.
So basically the same as if someone hacked flathub? Or if someone hacked Canonical/Debian/Red Hat/whoever and gained access to their package signing key?
Oh, it totally could.
I don’t actually see anyone in here making such an argument.
How is this notable or interesting then? I thought we were all just accepting that malicious software is an inherent part of all open platforms.
Open platforms often have individuals running/hosting their own repositories, which means the risk is distributed.
This means that the individual repository can be attacked without affecting the whole network. The risk is still there, but they would have to simultaneously attack all repositories at once and succeed with all of them.
In a corporate-hosted platform like Snaps, you have one centralized location that can be abused and that can affect all repositories in the system.
If someone hacks Canonical, they can make the whole Snap Store an attack vector without nearly as much effort.
So basically the same as if someone hacked flathub? Or if someone hacked Canonical/Debian/Red Hat/whoever and gained access to their package signing key?